The matter is 'that which stamps it as presenting,as judging , etc.', in the sense that those acts have the samematter whose intended object (and the way that it is intended) is the same.
The resultant picture of the 21st century world of high technology, instant communication, tight international connectivity at all levels of society, and universal education is one of a political world not only constantly evolving but evolving more rapidly, where actors can change course abruptly, policies that worked can suddenly fail, and success will go to the nimble.
Wolterstorff (1992) and Levinson (1992) complain that acounterintuitive implication of Currie’s proposal is that onecannot read a literary work. Levinson (1992) takes up thequestion of work individuation and asks whether Beethoven and twinBeethoven really make the same works, even though they act withinqualitatively identical cultures and come up with tokens of the same artisticstructure via qualitatively identical paths. Do such examplescarry any weight in an ontology of art?
Devitt explicates and defends the central tenets of realism as an ontological thesis and gives an account of mind-independence. Devitt furthermore argues that, quite generally, realism has nothing to do with epistemological matters, thereby denying that there is any genuinely realist position that answers to the label “realism as an epistemological thesis,” contrary to what we have assumed.
Consider, for example, our apprehension of the state of affairs .
In attributing artistic and aesthetic modes of existence to works,Gilson adverted to a physical object’s relation to the experiences andactions of cognizing subjects. Similarly, a long series ofphilosophers have taken subjective relations and experiences to becrucial to answering the question of the existence of works of art. Ithas often been proposed, for example, that works are at least in parta product of the imagination, and this not merely in the sense thatsome artist must imagine what sort of thing he or she wants to make ordo if a work of art is to be brought into existence. Instead, thethought is that even the existence or reality of a completed work ofart continues to depend on the make-believe or imaginative activity ofthe artist or some other subject, such as the observer or reader whoappreciates the work as a work of art.
Are they, for example, realisable within the locus of a machine?
The specific worries about (1) guaranteeing the mutual exclusivenessand joint exhaustiveness of the categories, and (2) whether or not anysingle system of categories could purport to be uniquely correct, can, however,be met by certain ways of formulating ontological categories. The firstsort of worry can be met by ensuring that categories (of the samelevel) are defined in ways that guarantee mutual exclusiveness andexhaustiveness. Thus, e.g., Thomasson (1999, chapter 8) distinguishescategories in terms of what relations of dependence a purported entityhas or lacks on mental states (and a second dimensiondistinguished in terms of what relations of dependence a purportedentity has or lacks on spatio-temporally located objects), so that thelaw of the excluded middle alone ensures mutual exclusiveness andexhaustiveness of the categories distinguished. (Dummett’s methodof distinguishing categories provides another route for guaranteeingmutual exclusivity—see §2.3 below).
-- 1984 , Athens, Ohio:University of Ohio Press.
Thisshould not, however, be taken to imply that Husserl identifies the notionsof truth and evidence (and much less does he confuse them):
In itself the proposition plainly does notstate the same thing as its equivalent .