The former are not meaningless.

Devitt, Michael. Realism and Truth. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.

The matter is 'that which stamps it as presenting,as judging , etc.', in the sense that those acts have the samematter whose intended object (and the way that it is intended) is the same.

The resultant picture of the 21st century world of high technology, instant communication, tight international connectivity at all levels of society, and universal education is one of a political world not only constantly evolving but evolving more rapidly, where actors can change course abruptly, policies that worked can suddenly fail, and success will go to the nimble.

Wolterstorff (1992) and Levinson (1992) complain that acounterintuitive implication of Currie’s proposal is that onecannot read a literary work. Levinson (1992) takes up thequestion of work individuation and asks whether Beethoven and twinBeethoven really make the same works, even though they act withinqualitatively identical cultures and come up with tokens of the same artisticstructure via qualitatively identical paths. Do such examplescarry any weight in an ontology of art?

For this reason, the balancing process helps to maintain the stability of relations between states.

Devitt explicates and defends the central tenets of realism as an ontological thesis and gives an account of mind-independence. Devitt furthermore argues that, quite generally, realism has nothing to do with epistemological matters, thereby denying that there is any genuinely realist position that answers to the label “realism as an epistemological thesis,” contrary to what we have assumed.

Consider, for example, our apprehension of the state of affairs .

In attributing artistic and aesthetic modes of existence to works,Gilson adverted to a physical object’s relation to the experiences andactions of cognizing subjects. Similarly, a long series ofphilosophers have taken subjective relations and experiences to becrucial to answering the question of the existence of works of art. Ithas often been proposed, for example, that works are at least in parta product of the imagination, and this not merely in the sense thatsome artist must imagine what sort of thing he or she wants to make ordo if a work of art is to be brought into existence. Instead, thethought is that even the existence or reality of a completed work ofart continues to depend on the make-believe or imaginative activity ofthe artist or some other subject, such as the observer or reader whoappreciates the work as a work of art.

Are they, for example, realisable within the locus of a machine?

A weakness of the balance of power concept is the difficulty of measuring power.

The specific worries about (1) guaranteeing the mutual exclusivenessand joint exhaustiveness of the categories, and (2) whether or not anysingle system of categories could purport to be uniquely correct, can, however,be met by certain ways of formulating ontological categories. The firstsort of worry can be met by ensuring that categories (of the samelevel) are defined in ways that guarantee mutual exclusiveness andexhaustiveness. Thus, e.g., Thomasson (1999, chapter 8) distinguishescategories in terms of what relations of dependence a purported entityhas or lacks on mental states (and a second dimensiondistinguished in terms of what relations of dependence a purportedentity has or lacks on spatio-temporally located objects), so that thelaw of the excluded middle alone ensures mutual exclusiveness andexhaustiveness of the categories distinguished. (Dummett’s methodof distinguishing categories provides another route for guaranteeingmutual exclusivity—see §2.3 below).

-- 1984 , Athens, Ohio:University of Ohio Press.

Thisshould not, however, be taken to imply that Husserl identifies the notionsof truth and evidence (and much less does he confuse them):

In itself the proposition plainly does notstate the same thing as its equivalent .


The Four-Category Ontology: ..

'Each truthrepresents an ideal unity in relation to what is possibly an infinite andunlimited manifold of correct statements of the same form and matter.'(I A187/192) Even if there are no intelligent beings and no correct statementsthen this ideal unity and its associated possibilities of instantiationremain, though without actually being realised.

The Ontological Realism of Gustav Bergmann

These laws may however 'undergoevident transformations through which they acquire an express relationto knowledge and to the knowing subject, and now themselves pronounce onreal possibilities of knowing.' (I A239/233) It is in virtue of the possibilityof transformations of this sort that the propositions of logic may onceagain have application to real, cognitive achievements of thinking subjects.

The concluding essay differs from ..

Multi-dimensional systems (Husserl 1913/1962, §10; Ingarden1960/1964, Chapter 2; Thomasson 1999, Chapter 8; Smith forthcoming,Chapter 8) address the second worry to some extent by acknowledgingthat the different dimensions of categorization are possible, and thatno one-dimensional list can purport to completeness. In principle,multi-dimensionalists may even accept that there is no fixed number orlimit on how many one-dimensional lists of categories there may be,though each such list may purport to provide a unique, correct,exhaustive categorization of entities considered in the chosenrespect.

A Realistic Theory of Categories, ..

In any case, given the great potential uses of a system ofcategories (many of which do not depend on claims that that categorysystem is uniquely acceptable), we should not abandon attempts atsystems of categorization prematurely. Even if we do not think of acategory system as providing a realist inventory of all that exists, asystem of categories laid out in the descriptivist spirit provides aframework within which existence questions can be answered in a systematicand wholesale way, by enumerating categories so that we can thenundertake further investigations into whether or not there really isanything of each kind. Working from within a categorial framework canhelp ensure that whatever ontology we provide is principled andunified, avoiding ad hoc and piecemeal decisions. Thedescriptivist's categories also provide a tool that may be usedelsewhere in ontology, e.g., in helping to ensure that comparisons ofparsimony are legitimately made (by examining which categories ofentity are accepted and which denied by various theories), and inchecking that potential solutions to metaphysical problems are notoverlooked by tacit use of a category system that is not exhaustive(Thomasson 1999, Chapters 8 and 9). Indeed assumptions aboutcategorizations play such a strong role in philosophical discussions(e.g., discussions of the Cartesian theory of mind, Platonist theoriesof mathematics, etc.), that doing the work on categories necessary tomake these categorial assumptions explicit and open them forexamination must remain a highly useful exercise regardless of doubtsabout the prospects for discovering a uniquely correct system ofcategories.