This principle is what I call moralism, and has two forms. One, moralism proper, asserts the categorical imperative of an absolute reason or duty determining right judgment and conduct. In the other form, moralism becomes a principle of cosmology and religion; it asserts the actual dominance of reason or goodness over the universe at large.
There are thus two kinds of dogmatism, although both preserve this fundamental presupposition of animal intelligence, namely: that apprehension is informative, that antecedent or hidden facts exist to be discovered, and that knowledge of them is possible. But the initial kind of dogmatist, having only sensation and fancy to guide him, assumes that things are just as they seem or as he thinks they ought to be: and if this assumption be challenged, the rash dogmatist hotly denies the relativity of his knowledge and of his conscience. Now I have always asserted this double relativity; it is implied in my materialism. I am not, then, a dogmatist in this first popular sense of the word, but decidedly a sceptic. Yet I stoutly assert relativity; I am a dogmatist there; for I see clearly that an animal cannot exist without a habitat, and that his impulses and perceptions are soon directed upon it with a remarkable quickness and precision: he therefore has true and transitive knowledge. But I also see clearly that knowledge, if it takes an imaginative or moral form at all, must take a form determined by his specific senses and instincts. His true knowledge must then be, in its terms, relative to his nature, and no miraculous intuition of his habitat as it exists in itself.
Healthcare system is a yardstick to gauge a countries development. Healthy man is a valuable asset of a nation. However now a days obesity is becoming a growing concern for every countries and its induce immense pressure on health care system. Most of the people think that the problem would be overcome if various types of sports event & exercise be incorporated .I strongly agree with this aforementioned assertion.
The rebellion of the heathen soul is unmistakable in the Reformation, but it is not recognised in this simple form, because those who feel that it was justified do not dream that it was heathen, and those who see it was heathen will not admit that it was justified. Externally, of course, it was an effort to recover the original essence of Christianity; [but it] was simply the inertia of established prejudice that made people use tradition to correct tradition; until the whole substance of tradition, worn away by that internal friction, should be dissolved, and impulse and native genius should assert themselves unimpeded.
the concession was cancelled in ..
The autonomous moralist differs from the sophist or ethical sceptic in this: that he retains his integrity. In vindicating his ideal he does not recant his human nature. In asserting the initial right of every impulse in others, he remains the spokesman of his own. Knowledge of the world, courtesy, and fairness do not neutralise his positive life. He is thoroughly sincere, as the sophist is not; for every man, while he lives, embodies and enacts some special interest; and this truth, which those who confound psychology with ethics may think destructive of all authority in morals, is in fact what alone renders moral judgment possible and respectable. If the sophist declares that what his nature attaches him to is not 'really' a good, because it would not be a good, perhaps, for a different creature, he is a false interpreter of his own heart, and rather discreditably stultifies his honest feelings and actions by those theoretical valuations which, in guise of a mystical ethics, he gives out to the world.
georgie ziff class website / Concession and Refutation
In his philosophical writings and in his service as a Liberal memberof Parliament for Westminster from 1865 to 1868, Mill was a vigorousadvocate for extending the franchise. Though he recognized some limitsin the scope of the franchise, he was a consistent, though not alwayssuccessful, advocate for its extension beyond its then currentscope. He supported extending the franchise to previouslydisenfranchised members of the working class, and he was a staunchadvocate for female suffrage (479–81). To many, such views aboutthe appropriate scope of the franchise seemed quite radical. ThoughMill did support weighted voting, he may have seen this, at least inpart, as a necessary concession to succeed in securing his primaryobjective of (near) universal suffrage (476). It is worth bearing thiscontext in mind when evaluating Mill's proposals for the scope andweight of the franchise.
Cause Condition Concession Contrast | Causality | …
But the argument is not valid, from which it follows that we cannotappeal to the falsity of the illiberal conclusion to reject themoralistic premise. The legal moralist principle (1) asserts only apro tanto or prima facie reason to regulate. But apro tanto reason to regulate does not entail anall-thing-considered reason to regulate. In particular, even if thereis some reason to regulate conduct, there may be countervailing reasonsnot to regulate it. Perhaps the costs ofregulation—administrative and otherwise—exceed the benefitof regulation. But this shows that the legal moralist need not regulateall harmless wrongdoing, and this shows that it is not necessary toreject legal moralism as such in order to defend some liberalconclusions. This does not entail that Mill's rejection of legalmoralism is wrong, only that it is not necessary to deliver most of hisliberal conclusions.